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On the Stock Market’s Reaction 
to Major Railroad Accidents
This study examines the impact of train accidents on the stock price performance of the involved 
railroad companies. We employ a sample of 26 accidents involving trains operated by publicly 
traded U.S. and Canadian railroad companies between January 1993 and December 2003. Event 
study methodology is used to measure the abnormal performance of the involved railroad firms 
to these accidents. In addition, a series of univariate tests and cross-sectional regression analysis 
is employed to determine the factors that drive the abnormal returns for the firms in the sample. 
The magnitude of the initial price decline appears to be driven by various characteristics of both 
the firm and the accident itself. Specifically, there is strong evidence that suggests that one of the 
main determinants of the abnormal returns is expected legal liability claims against the railroads. 
Abnormal performance is negatively related to firm size and the number of injuries and fatalities 
resulting from the accident. In addition, accidents that result in hazardous material spills cause 
significantly larger stock price drops in the days following the event.  Finally, investors appear to 
differentiate between accident causes. Accidents caused by reckless or illegal behavior on behalf 
of one or more of the railroad company’s employees result in particularly large price declines. 
Accidents caused by mechanical failures or signal malfunctions, on the other hand, only cause small 
stock price drops.
by Thomas J. Walker, Kuntara Pukthuanthong, and Sergey S. Barabanov
INTRODUCTION
Although the North American railroad system 
is widely viewed to be one of the safest and 
most efficient in the world, the ever-increasing 
speed and size of today’s trains makes every 
accident a potentially disastrous one. In contrast 
to aviation accidents, which frequently involve 
a high number of casualties, the majority of 
railroad accidents in recent years have resulted 
in comparatively small losses of human life. 
Yet, because the railway system provides the 
preferred means for transporting hazardous 
materials over large distances, railroad 
accidents involve a substantially higher risk 
of resulting in ecologically disastrous spills of 
toxic chemicals, fuel, and radioactive materials 
(to name a few), which is rarely the case in 
aviation accidents.1
This paper investigates the economic 
consequences of a railroad accident from an 
investor’s point of view and examines the stock 
price performance of publicly traded U.S. and 
Canadian railroad companies following train 
accidents.  As a result of a train accident, the 
involved railroad companies are frequently 
the target of a plethora of legal liability claims 
filed by the surviving relatives of the accident 
victims or the surviving, but injured, accident 
victims themselves. In addition, in cases where 
a railroad accident results in a hazardous 
material spill, railroad companies are usually 
liable for third-party damages and the required 
cleanup costs.
Although railroad companies are typically 
insured against liability claims, train accidents 
cause significant price declines for the involved 
firms. We argue that legal costs, diversion of 
management time, rising insurance premiums, 
repair and/or replacement costs for the damaged 
train and its cargo, and loss of consumer 
confidence accompanied with fewer passenger 
bookings or cargo hauls represent real costs for 
the involved firms.
The analysis follows Chance and Ferris 
(1987), who study the stock price reaction of 
airlines and airplane manufacturers following 
an airplane crash using a sample of 46 aviation 
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disasters between 1962 and 1985. Chance and 
Ferris (1987) observe a significant price reaction 
for airlines but not for airplane manufacturers 
on the day of the crash. Similarly, Davidson 
et al. (1987) employ a sample of 57 crashes 
over the period 1965 - 1984. They observe a 
significant price decline for airlines on the day 
of the crash. In their sample, the negative returns 
are reversed in the days following the crash. 
Finally, Thiengtham and Walker (2005) employ 
a sample of 174 aviation disasters involving 
airplanes operated by publicly traded U.S. 
carriers between January 1950 and December 
2004 and observe that investors are highly 
sensitive to potential legal liability claims when 
determining the new stock price equilibrium 
for the involved airline company and airplane 
manufacturer.
While the stock market effects of aviation 
disasters have been sufficiently studied, there 
is to our knowledge no study that performs a 
similar analysis for railroad accidents.  Studies 
that examine the financial consequences of 
railroad accidents typically focus on direct 
costs for the involved railroad company or 
the affected communities.2 Yet, it is important 
to understand how investors react to such 
accidents.  The paper attempts to fill this gap 
by analyzing both the short-term and long-term 
impact of train accidents on the stock prices of 
the involved railroad firms using a sample of 26 
major accidents that occurred between January 
1993 and December 2003.3
In addition, the paper adds to the existing 
literature by not only measuring the magnitude 
of the stock price reaction, but by examining 
why investors tend to react differently to 
different types of accidents. To accomplish this, 
a series of univariate tests and cross-sectional 
regression analysis is employed to measure the 
effect of various characteristics of the accident 
on the abnormal performance of the involved 
firms. Particular attention is paid to the causes 
and consequences of each accident, and whether 
investors incorporate expected legal liability 
claims into their trading decisions. In addition, 
the paper examines whether certain types of 
railroad firms are more affected than others.
Finally, the study examines whether 
investors react rationally to accident 
announcements. It is expected that railroad 
company stocks drop after an accident. What is 
interesting from an academic point of view is 
whether investors are able to quickly predict the 
price of a stock after an accident, as is suggested 
by the efficient market hypothesis of Fama et 
al. (1969). The results indicate otherwise (i.e., 
we find a clear violation of the efficient market 
hypothesis) as initial stock price declines for 
railroad firms during the first day of trading are 
consistently followed by additional declines 
during a period of few days, and an almost 
complete reversal within approximately two 
weeks.4 The results are robust to the removal of 
outliers and variations in sample construction 
and methodology.
The results of this study are consistent with 
Thiengtham and Walker (2005), who observe 
a strong relationship between legal liability 
concerns and stock price reactions for large 
aviation disasters. In addition, the findings 
of a continued price decline that persists for 
several days after the event, and the subsequent 
reversal, is similar in nature to the stock price 
reversal observed by Davidson et al. (1987). 
At the same time, the results are contrary to 
the findings of Sprecher and Pertl (1983), who 
study a cross section of industries and observe 
that large losses had a negative effect on stock 
returns with no reversal in the first few days 
following the losses.5
The paper is organized as follows:  The 
following section explains the methodology used 
to test several hypotheses concerning the stock 
performance of railroad companies following 
train accidents.  The data section describes the 
data sources and defines the variables used in 
the analysis.  The last two sections present the 
empirical results of the analysis and provide 
concluding remarks.
METHODOLOGY
Event study methodology was used to measure 
the abnormal stock price performance of railroad 
companies following train accidents. Event 
study methodology measures the abnormal 
return of a stock as the difference between the 
actual return and the expected return, around 
the time of an event.  Event studies draw on the 
efficient market hypothesis of Fama et al. (1969), 
which states that capital markets are efficient in 
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processing information by establishing a correct 
new stock price equilibrium as soon as new 
information about a firm becomes available. 
The logic underlying the hypothesis is the 
belief that investors in capital markets process 
publicly available information on firm activities 
and external events influencing a firm, and that 
they consider not just the impact on current 
performance but also on the performance of 
the firm in future periods. When additional 
information becomes available, the firm’s stock 
price should change rapidly and should reflect 
investors’ revised consensus of the firm’s future 
profitability.
The strength of the method lies in the fact 
that it captures the overall assessment by a large 
number of investors of the discounted value of 
current and future firm performance attributable 
to individual events, which are reflected in the 
stock price and the market value of the firm. 
Changes in investors’ beliefs regarding the 
future profitability of a firm are reflected in 
abnormal returns – risk adjusted returns less 
than the firm’s expected return – following 
the accident. Abnormal returns thus provide a 
unique means of associating the impact of an 
accident announcement on the firm’s expected 
profitability in future periods (McWilliams and 
Siegel 1997).
In the transportation sector, there is 
significant empirical support for the efficient 
market hypothesis, including the Carter and 
Simpkins (2004) and Flouris and Walker (2004) 
studies of airline stocks following 9-11. Event 
studies have also been applied in other industry 
sectors. Hill and Schneeweis (1983) and Bowen 
et al. (1983), for example, use event studies to 
examine the effect of the 1979 Three Mile Island 
accident on utility stocks. In addition, event 
study methodology is widely used in insurance 
studies that evaluate the effects of various 
kinds of disasters on the stock performance of 
insurance companies.6
To calculate the effect of an event, it is 
necessary to estimate what the price of the stock 
would have been had the event not occurred. To 
do this, and to control for overall market effects, 
the price of the stock is regressed against a 
stock market index. The estimated coefficients 
from that regression are used to calculate the 
predicted value of the stock over the time 
window in which the stock price is adjusted. 
This yields the regression:
(1)
where R
s,t is the return of stock s at time 
t: R
s,t
 = (Prices,t – Prices,t-1 ) / Prices,t-1. If the firm 
paid a dividend during the event window, it is 
included in the return calculations. The subscript 
t indicates time, the subscript s indicates a 
specific stock, and the subscript m indicates 
the market. The εs,t is a random error term for 
stock s at time t, and the β’s are coefficients to 
be estimated. For this study, the S&P 500 or the 
TSE 300 index was used to proxy for the U.S. 
or Canadian market, respectively.
The date of the event is denoted as 
t = 0. To estimate the expected return, data from 
t = [-750,-1] (i.e., 750 trading days, or 
approximately three years, of pre-event data) 
is used. Several other intervals were considered 
with no significant difference in the results. In 
addition, several other methods of calculating a 
firm’s expected return were considered, again 
with no significant differences.7
The coefficient estimates from regression 
(1) were used to predict the expected return 
over various post-event windows. To estimate 
the abnormal return of a stock on day t, 
AR
s,t 
, this paper follows Brown and Warner 
(1985) and subtracts the expected return on 






 are estimates of 
the true parameters obtained via ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression. The abnormal returns 
are simply the prediction errors of the model 
over the event window. Notice here that AR 
are abnormal returns; that is, they are returns 
over and above the return predicted by general 
market trends on a given day. The assumption 
of the methodology is that the abnormal returns 
are the result of the announcement and not 
some other random event occurring on the 
same day. The strength of the method is linked 
to the improbability of random events across 
different firms on different days coinciding with 
the announcement of a railroad accident. The 
standard errors are calculated by the formula 
R Rs t m t s t, , ,= + +β β ε0 1
AR R Rs t s t i m t, , ,= − +( )β β0
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defined by Judge et al. (1988):
(3) 
where 2SS  is the variance of the error from the 
estimation model, R
M
 is the mean market return 
over the prediction interval, and T represents 
the number of days in the estimation interval. 
The τ indicates observations within the event 
window, while the t indicates observations in 
the estimation interval. Notice that the standard 
error on any given day τ of the prediction 
interval is a function of how much the actual 
market return on that day deviates from the 
mean market return during the estimation 
interval. Thus, on days on which the market 
return is very different from the expected market 
return the standard errors of abnormal returns 
are greater. Notice also that the standard error 
depends on the length of the estimation interval, 
such that longer estimation intervals lead to 
lower standard errors.
Under the assumption that the returns on 
each day are independent, the standard errors 
are cumulative, so the proper standard error is 
the cumulative standard error. This is because 
adding independent normal variables requires 
adding the standard errors. Thus, we have the 
following equations to describe the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) over time for a given 
stock for a given accident, and the variance of 




From these equations we can calculate the 
average CAR across all N firms in the sample 






To test the hypothesis that the mean CAR 
is different from zero on any given day, one 
would use a Student’s t test which, under the 
null hypothesis of zero returns, is of the form:
(8) 
The null hypothesis to be tested is that 
the mean excess return during a given event 
windows is equal to zero. It is assumed that 
the return is negative, thus, a one tailed t-test 
is applied. In addition, because t-tests are based 
on strong assumptions about the underlying 
return distribution, a Wilcoxon signed rank test 
(a non-parametric test) was used to ensure the 
robustness of the results. In a Wilcoxon test, 
both the sign and the magnitude of the abnormal 
performance are taken into consideration when 
calculating the test statistic.
To shed some light on the cross-sectional 
determinants of the stock market’s reaction to 
a railroad accident announcement, the study 
explores the relation among the cumulative 
abnormal returns around the event and various 
factors that describe the accident as well as the 
involved firm itself. To accomplish this, OLS 
regressions are used as follows:
(9) 
where x1s,…, xns  are n factors that describe 
firm s or the railroad accident involving the 
firm, and s is the zero-mean error term that 
is uncorrelated with the x’s. α0,...,αn  are the 
regression coefficients of themodel.  Regression 
results are reported for cumulative abnormal 
returns calculated over periods of 1 to 21 trading 
days following an accident to examine both the 
immediate and subsequent stock price reaction 
to an accident announcement.8
DATA
The sample contains data on railroad accidents 
as published by the U.S. National Transportation 
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ntsb.gov) the NTSB provides information on 
railroad accidents involving U.S. and Canadian 
owned trains dating back to 1967. Specifically, 
the database covers information on accidents 
involving interstate passenger and cargo trains 
as well as local transit systems and commuter 
trains.9,10 While detailed information on 
accidents in early years is scarce, the NTSB 
provides detailed information for accidents it 
investigated after 1993. Among other things, 
accident reports published by the NTSB provide 
a description of the accident, an analysis of the 
accident cause, and a summary of accident 
outcomes, including the number of injuries 
and fatalities and an estimate of total property 
damages.
Because some of the records maintained 
by the NTSB are incomplete, additional online 
databases including the website of the Federal 
Railroad Administration’s Office of Safety 
Analysis (http://safetydata.fra.dot.gov) and the 
U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of 
Transportation Statistics (http://www.transtats.
bts.gov) were accessed to complete the data 
set. To ensure consistency in sample formation, 
overlapping records were cross referenced and 
compared between the databases. No significant 
inconsistencies were found.11
To ensure that only information that was 
readily available to investors after an accident 
is included in the analysis, Lexis/Nexis was 
accessed to retrieve information on the accident 
causes and consequences that were reported 
in initial news reports and prior to an official 
investigation by the NTSB and other agencies. 
In cases where initial news reports differed 
from later NTSB findings, data from the news 
reports was used in the analysis.
To ensure that the sample only includes 
accidents that present a meaningful financial 
risk to the involved company and its 
stakeholders, “minor” accidents were excluded 
from the sample. To be included in the sample, 
an accident must have resulted in at least 
one of the following: a fatality, at least 50 
injuries, estimated property damages of at least 
$10 million, or a hazardous material spill.12 
Accidents that did not fulfill at least one of 
these criteria were dropped from the sample. 
Furthermore, accidents caused by third parties, 
such as motor vehicle drivers who caused a 
collision due to inattentive or unlawful behavior 
at a railroad crossing, were deleted from the 
sample. In cases where two or more trains from 
different railroad companies were involved in 
an accident, only the impact on the railroad 
company that was found to be responsible for 
the accident was analyzed.
Daily stock price returns, adjusted for 
dividends and stock splits, and information on 
the daily market capitalization for all publicly 
traded railroad companies were retrieved from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices at 
the University of Chicago Graduate School of 
Business (CRSP).  For U.S. firms, the Standard 
and Poor S&P 500 market index (also retrieved 
through CRSP) was used to proxy for market 
returns. In addition, weekly three-month U.S. 
Treasury Security indexes as reported by the 
U.S. Treasury Department and the Federal 
Reserve were employed as a proxy for the risk-
free interest rate during the sample period.  For 
Canadian firms, the TSE 300 was used as a 
market proxy, and weekly data on annualized 
three-month Treasury Bill yields, as calculated 
by the Bank of Canada, was employed as a 
proxy for the risk-free interest rate.13
Table 1 provides summary statistics for 
the sample. As shown in Table 1, the dataset 
includes information on 26 railroad accidents 
involving trains owned by publicly traded U.S. 
and Canadian companies between January 1, 
1993 and December 31, 2003. More than 300 
people were injured and 23 people lost their 
lives in these accidents. Ten accidents resulted 
in hazardous material spills (not counting 
fuel spills from damaged locomotives) and 
estimated railroad property damages exceeded 
U.S. $109 million.
Definition of Variables
For each railroad accident a variety of variables 
were recorded, including the name of the 
involved railroad company/companies, the 
date and location of the accident, the number 
of injuries and fatalities, and estimated property 
damages. In addition, a dummy variable was 
defined that indicates whether or not the crash 
resulted in a hazardous material spill.
To account for possible differences between 
the U.S. and Canadian stock markets, a dummy 
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variable was created that distinguishes between 
accidents involving trains operated by U.S. and 
Canadian companies.
Finally, to control for the size of the 
involved firms, the natural log of the market 
capitalization of each railroad company one day 
before the accident was calculated. Similarly, 
the natural log of the estimated property 
damages was calculated to measure direct 
economic costs associated with the accident. 
Expressing the variable in logs helps resolve 
problems related to non-normality encountered 
for both variables during preliminary tests and 
allows for a percentage-based interpretation of 
their regression coefficients.14  For consistency, 
each firm’s market capitalization and estimated 
property damages were discounted back to 
1993 using CPI inflation rates published by the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) or the 
Bank of Canada. An exact variable definition is 
provided in Table 2.
Classification of Accident Causes
We hypothesize that the cause of an accident 
influences the way the market reacts to the 
corresponding news announcement. Reckless 
behavior on behalf of the crew or controller, 
including speeding, intoxication or drug abuse, 
for example, is likely to be followed by more 
media coverage and larger legal claims against 
the railroad company than a non-reckless 
crew error or the discovery of a mechanical 
malfunction of train equipment, a damaged 
track, or a signal failure.
On the other hand, it is expected that the 
presence of poor weather conditions at the 
crash site reduces the legal liability of the 
railroad firm. Fog, for example, that made it 
difficult for a train operator to spot a signal or 
the presence of ice on the tracks that made it 
even tougher than usual for the train operator to 














Panel A.  All Railroad Accidents
Entire sample period
1993-2003 26 109.01 318 23 10
Panel B.  Summary Statistics by Year
1993 1 14.00 59 0 0
1994 - - - - -
1995 - - - - -
1996 4 12.05 3 3 2
1997 6 7.23 4 6 3
1998 1 2.60 0 0 1
1999 3 6.53 4 4 0
2000 3 35.00 12 4 1
2001 3 13.68 69 2 1
2002 3 13.62 165 3 1
2003 2 4.30 2 1 1
Table 1: Summary Statistics
The table provides summary statistics for the sample of 26 railroad accidents between January 1, 1993, and 
December 31, 2003, involving railroad companies traded on a U.S. or Canadian exchange. Panel A contains 
aggregate statistics for the entire sample period. Panel B provides a breakdown by year.
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Table 2: Variable Definitions
Variable Data Source Description
ln(MKTCAP) CRSP, BLS /
Bank of Canada
Natural log of the railroad company’s market 
capitalization one day prior to the accident date, 
converted to 1993 dollars based on CPI data from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) or the Bank of 
Canada
ln(DAMAGE) NTSB, BLS /
Bank of Canada
Natural log of estimated property damages, converted 
to 1993 dollars based on CPI data from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) or the Bank of Canada
US RAILROAD NTSB Dummy variable that indicates whether or not the 
affected railroad company is headquartered in the 
U.S. (1=yes, 0=no)15
FATALITIES NTSB Number of fatalities (crew, passengers, and third 
parties)
INJURIES NTSB Number of people injured (crew, passengers, and 
third parties)
HAZMAT SPILL NTSB Dummy variable that indicates whether or not the 
accident resulted in a hazardous material spill (1=yes, 
0=no)
as a mitigating factor when determining the 
company’s legal liability. 
To ensure that the analysis is only based 
on publicly available information (i.e., 
information that investors could actually react 
to), various news services including Lexis/
Nexis, Bloomberg, and Reuters were accessed 
to determine what accident causes were reported 
in the initial news reports. If the cause was 
unknown within 24 hours of the accident and 
was only later determined by the NTSB, the 
accident was classified as “cause unknown.” 
Table 3 provides an overview of the accident 
classification.
RESULTS
The empirical analysis starts by examining the 
stock price reaction of railroad companies to 
railroad accidents over various time horizons 
after the event. Table 4 provides an overview of 
the short-term results. The event day is denoted 
as day 0. Because it was impossible to identify 
for every accident whether it was announced 
prior to or after the market close, a railroad 
stock’s immediate price reaction was measured 
as the cumulative abnormal return during days 
0 and 1. This ensures that if the event took place 
or was announced after 4:00 p.m. Eastern Time 
(the close of the major U.S. and Canadian stock 
markets), the market’s reaction is captured on 
the day after the event.
Although stock price declines during an 
(0,1) event window (i.e., on the day of the 
accident and the following trading day) are 
well above 4% in some instances, our aggregate 
results across the whole sample are only weakly 
significant. While we observe an average stock 
price decline of 1.48% on those two days, the 
p-values from a t-test and Wilcoxon signed rank 
test are only slightly lower than 0.05, suggesting 
that they are only marginally significant at the 
5% significance level.  Moreover, a reversal of 
the initial stock price decline is observed within 
a few days after the announcement and generally 
insignificant results over event periods of 
more than three days, suggesting that investor 
behavior following railroad accidents is similar 
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Table 3: Classification of Accident Causes
Variable Data Source Description
MECHANICAL NTSB, Lexis/Nexis, 
Bloomberg, Reuters
Mechanical failure, e.g. equipment or 
instrument failure, damaged tracks, signal 
failure (dummy variable: 1=yes, 0=no)
HUMAN ERROR NTSB, Lexis/Nexis, 
Bloomberg, Reuters
Error by train operator or controller/dispatcher, 
e.g. fatigue, miscommunication (dummy 
variable: 1=yes, 0=no)
RECKLESSNESS NTSB, Lexis/Nexis, 
Bloomberg, Reuters
Reckless or illegal behavior by train operator or 
controller/dispatcher, e.g. alcohol and/or other 
drug abuse, speeding, absence from primary 
job site (dummy variable: 1=yes, 0=no)
OTHER NTSB, Lexis/Nexis, 
Bloomberg, Reuters
Other/unknown cause (dummy variable: 1=yes, 
0=no)
POOR WEATHER NTSB, Lexis/Nexis, 
Bloomberg, Reuters
Poor weather conditions, e.g. fog and/or ice on 
crash site (dummy variable: 1=yes, 0=no)
Table 4: Abnormal Performance of Railroad Firms Following Train Accidents








0 to 1 days -1.48% 0.042 0.039
0 to 2 days -1.90% 0.048 0.040
0 to 5 days (1 week) -1.31% 0.106 0.083
0 to 7 days (1.5 weeks) -0.94% 0.195 0.177
0 to 10 days (2 weeks) -0.27% 0.434 0.472
0 to 21 days (1 month) -0.19% 0.785 0.601
0 to 63 days (3 months) 0.42% 0.714 0.625
0 to 125 days (6 months) 0.57% 0.883 0.807
0 to 250 days (1 year) 0.28% 0.961 0.959
in spirit to the investor behavior following 
aviation accidents observed by Davidson et 
al. (1987). To ensure that the results are robust 
to variations in sample selection criteria, the 
requirements were varied (i.e., the minimum 
number of injuries, fatalities, property damages, 
and hazardous material spills that were set 
during the initial sample construction). Not 
surprisingly, the event study results became 
economically and statistically more significant 
when selecting only larger accidents (i.e., 
accidents with a higher number of fatalities, 
injuries, or property damages). Due to the 
accompanying decline in sample size, however, 
we decided to report the results for the initial 
sample of 26 accidents. The larger size of this 
sample has an advantage in that it allows for 
an examination of the variation in cumulative 
abnormal returns through a series of univariate 
tests and regression analysis, which becomes 
difficult when the sample size is too small.
Figure 1 presents the results graphically 
by plotting the cumulative abnormal returns 
of railroad companies within 20 trading days 
prior to and after the accident. Since the event 
is unanticipated, there should be no price 
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movements before the event. The pre-event 
period is useful, however, for comparing 
with the post-event period. In Figure 1 the 
stock price drops on days 0 and 1, followed 
by an almost complete recovery during the 
next seven days of trading. This is somewhat 
surprising as it is inconsistent with the efficient 
market hypothesis, which states that stock 
prices should immediately and correctly adjust 
to an announcement, and that subsequent 
price corrections should not be observed. The 
significance of this observation was tested 
and it was found that the price recovery of 
1.63% observed between day 2 and day 10 is 
significant by itself even when ignoring the 
price decline of 1.90% during the preceding 
(0,2) event window.
Not surprisingly, there are no clear trends 
in Figure 1 prior to the accident. In contrast to 
other studies which often examine the effects of 
information leakage prior to an announcement, 
such an analysis is not necessary in this case.
Univariate Analysis
To provide some intuition for the variables used 
in the subsequent regression analysis, a series of 
univariate tests was performed. These tests are 
useful to examine whether mean and median 
cumulative abnormal returns for railroad 
companies vary across various subsamples of 
the dataset. Two-sample t-tests were used to test 
for the significance of differences in means; and 
Kruskal-Wallis median tests were employed to 
test for the significance of differences in medians 
between each set of subsamples. Median tests 
have the advantage of being more robust to 
outliers and extreme observations. Subsamples 
were constructed based on various factors that 
characterize the respective firm or the accident. 
The results are presented in Table 5.
Firm characteristics, such as market 
capitalization and national origin, explain 
little of the differences in CARs. Factors that 
pertain directly to the accident, however, 
provide interesting insights into the reasons 
why investors react differently to various types 
of accidents. In particular, accidents that result 
in hazardous material spills cause significantly 
larger price declines during the first two days 
of trading (-3.26%) than accidents that did 
not cause hazardous material spills (-0.95%). 
This is consistent with initial expectations and 
suggests that investors incorporate expected 
direct and indirect costs (which tend to be 
significantly higher for such accidents due 
Figure 1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns Around Railroad Accidents
Cumulative abnormal returns were calculated for railroad companies during the 20 training days 
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Table 5: Preliminary Examination of Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Subsets of the sample were formed by distinguishing between small and large railroad companies (based 
on the firms’ discounted market capitalization), U.S. and Canadian firms, accidents that caused more or less 
than US$5 million in property damage, accidents that involved (or did not involve) hazardous material spills, 
accidents that involved less than or more than two fatalities, and crashes that involved less than or more 
than 50 injuries. In addition, the subsets distinguish between accidents caused by mechanical failures, human 
errors, and reckless behavior (versus other causes).  Finally, the subsamples distinguish between accidents that 
occurred during poor weather conditions (fog and/or ice on the accident site) and accidents that occurred under 
regular weather conditions. For each subsample, the number of observations N, as well as mean and median 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) during a (0,1) event window are reported. T-tests and Kruskal-Wallis 
tests are employed to test for the equality of mean and median CARs between each set of subsamples. The last 
column reports p-values for both tests.
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to higher than expected cleanup costs, bad 
publicity, and potentially large legal liability 
claims) into their trading decisions.
Similarly, accidents that led to more than 
50 injuries caused a significantly larger stock 
price decline (-2.77%) than accidents in which 
less than 50 people were injured (-1.10%).16 
A similar, although less significant, difference 
can be observed when comparing accidents 
that resulted in fewer than or more than two 
fatalities.17  Finally, it was investigated whether 
different accident causes lead to different 
investor reactions. As expected, accidents caused 
by mechanical failures or non-reckless human 
errors entail smaller stock price declines than 
accidents that resulted from reckless behavior 
by one of the railroad company’s employees. 
Punitive damage awards for the plaintiffs tend 
to be particularly high in such cases as plaintiff 
lawyers are often successful in arguing that the 
company was grossly negligent in allowing 
such misconduct.  In addition, the bad publicity 
arising from such an incident and possible 
consumer mistrust in the safety standards of the 
involved railroad company are hypothesized to 
cause a stronger market reaction.
As expected, accidents that occurred 
during poor weather conditions are associated 
with a somewhat smaller price drop (-0.33%) 
than accidents that occurred under no unusual 
weather conditions (-1.69%), but the difference 
is statistically insignificant.
Correlation Analysis
Table 6 displays the correlation matrix of 
independent variables that are hypothesized to 
have an impact on abnormal returns. Judging 
by the magnitude and significance of the 
correlation coefficients, there is little reason 
to be concerned about multicollinearity in the 
model.
Only two variables have a correlation 
coefficient that is larger than 0.7 in absolute 
terms: the natural log of a firm’s market 
capitalization and its national origin (U.S. versus 
Canadian firms). This is not surprising as the 
market capitalization of the Canadian firms in 
the sample tends to be much lower than that of 
U.S. firms. To ensure that the regression results 
are not affected by a potential multicollinearity 
problem that might arise when including both 
variables, models in which either of these 
variables was excluded were also estimated. 
Since the magnitude and significance of the 
regression coefficients was little affected, we 
decided to report regression results for the full 
model specification in the following section.
Regression Analysis
Because univariate analysis only allows for 
an examination of the impact of one factor 
at a time without controlling for changes in 
other variables, ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regressions for railroad company CARs during 
various event windows after each accident were 
performed.
Table 7 contains results for five regressions 
in which CARs were regressed against a 
variety of variables that characterize both the 
company itself and the accident it experienced. 
The discussion focuses on the second column 
in which regression results for the abnormal 
return the railroad experienced during its first 
two days of trading (i.e., during the (0,1) event 
window) are presented.  The results are largely 
consistent with the results from the univariate 
analysis. Accidents resulting in many injuries 
or fatalities, as well as accidents involving 
hazardous material spills, cause significantly 
larger price declines. While a breakdown by 
national origin and size provided no significant 
results in the univariate analysis, both variables 
become significant in the regression model. 
Specifically, larger firms are more affected by 
accidents than smaller firms. Similarly, U.S. 
firms are more affected than Canadian firms. 
While one might think that larger firms should 
be in a better position to absorb the losses from 
an accident, the results are consistent with 
Alexander (1991), who argues that plaintiffs 
preferentially seek out “deep pocket” defendants 
in hopes of extracting larger settlements, and 
with an aviation study by Thiengtham and 
Walker (2005), who observe a stronger stock 
price reaction for large airlines following 
aviation disasters. The fact that Canadian 
railroad firms, after controlling for size, show 
a smaller price decline after an accident is 
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Us railroad 0.752 -0.009
Fatalities -0.187 -0.408 -0.212
Injuries 0.052 0.092 0.146 0.039
Hazmat spill 0.262 0.326 0.158 -0.403 -0.282
Mechanical 0.273 0.202 0.192 -0.245 0.466 0.426
Human error 0.297 0.209 0.158 0.403 0.367 0.133 0.426
Recklessness -0.358 -0.361 -0.192 0.010 0.342 -0.572 -0.278 -0.426
Poor weather 0.002 0.078 0.083 0.212 -0.146 -0.158 -0.192 -0.158 0.192
Table 6: Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables
For each pair of variables, the Pearson correlation coefficient was calculated using the following formula:
where x  and s1 are the sample mean and standard deviation for the first sample, y  and s2 are the same for the 
second sample, and n is the sample size.
r





∑ ( )( )
( )1 1 2
somewhat surprising, especially since they can 
be sued under U.S. law if they were involved in 
an accident on U.S. territory.
As in the univariate analysis, mechanical 
failures are generally associated with a smaller 
price decline. On the other hand, accidents 
caused by reckless behavior entail significantly 
larger stock price drops. Interestingly, the 
presence of poor weather conditions tends to 
mitigate price declines, likely as a result of a 
lower probability to be found responsible for 
the accident.
The regression model fits very well when 
examining short-term CARs and explains 
approximately 84% of the variation in returns 
during the (0,1) event window (i.e., during the 
first two days of trading). When examining 
longer-term returns, the model provides a poorer 
fit, and both the size and statistical significance 
of the regressors drops. From an economic 
perspective, the results may be interpreted as 
follows: a firm that is twice as large as another 
firm experiencing a comparable accident will 
experience an additional stock price decline 
of 0.17% during the (0,1) event window.18  In 
the same vein, an accident that has twice the 
estimated damages than another accident 
– all else being the same – should lead to an 
additional stock price drop of 0.22%.  Similarly, 
the results suggest that every additional fatality 
or injury causes an additional stock price drop 
of 0.21% or 0.03%, respectively.19
An interpretation of the dummy variables 
is also straightforward and suggests that 
U.S. railroads suffer a price decline that 
is approximately 0.42% larger than that 
of Canadian railroads involved in similar 
accidents. Similarly, hazardous material spills 
lead to a highly significant additional stock price 
decline of 0.76% during the first two days of 
trading. Finally, while human errors as potential 
accident causes appear to explain little of the 
variation in abnormal returns, crashes caused 
by mechanical failures lead to price declines 
that are 0.24% smaller than other accidents. 
In contrast, accidents caused by reckless 
behavior tend to cause a stock price drop that is 
0.33% larger than that of other accidents. This 
relationship is expected as reckless behavior 
leads to potentially larger damage awards when 
a case is decided through a jury verdict.  The 
presence of poor weather conditions reduces 
price declines by a marginally significant 
0.22%. 
CONCLUSIONS
That train accidents have a negative impact on 
the stock performance of the involved railroad 
companies comes as no surprise. However, 
why certain types of accidents cause large price 
declines while others have almost no impact 
is puzzling.. This question was addressed 
by exploring the factors behind a railroad 
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Adjusted R2 84.1% 65.4% 51.8% 18.4% 11.8%
Table 7: OLS Regression Analysis of Abnormal Returns
company’s abnormal stock price performance 
following an accident. Anticipated legal liability 
claims appear to be a significant factor that 
drives the magnitude of a railroad stock’s initial 
price decline. Accidents that result in many 
injuries or fatalities and accidents that involve 
hazardous material spills cause particularly 
large price declines. In addition, railroad stocks 
are particularly hard hit if the crash is caused 
by reckless or illegal behavior by one of its 
employees.
From the standpoint of investors who holds 
the shares of the respective railroad companies 
in their portfolio, a railroad accident clearly 
has a wealth-diminishing effect. Yet, the price 
decline is almost completely reversed within 
10 trading days (two weeks) after the accident. 
For a majority of accidents, there is a short-term 
downward trend in a railroad’s stock price that 
persists for approximately three trading days 
after the event. Subsequently, most affected 
railroad stocks recover to pre-event levels 
within a few days. Under the efficient market 
hypothesis, neither the prolonged downward 
trend during the first three days should be 
observed (unless the price declines are the result 
of delayed information dissemination) nor 




1. See Savage (1998) for an extensive discussion of railroad safety.
2. See, for example, Dennis (1996) who conducts a survey of hazardous rail accidents between 
1982 and 1992 and evaluates their costs for the involved railroad companies.
3. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) provides annual railroad accident statistics. In its 
2002 report, for example, the FRA lists 2,701 accidents during the year(see Table 1-1, U.S. 
Department of Transportation, Federal Railroad Administration, Railroad Safety Statistics, 
Interim Report 2002). This study applies various sample selection criteria in an attempt to focus 
only on major accidents that are likely to result in significant losses for the involved railroad 
company and its investors. In addition, the sample is restricted to accidents for which sufficient 
information was available.
4. While the continued price decline during the first days after an accident may be the result of 
slow information dissemination the subsequent price reversal should not be observed in an 
efficient market.
5. Sprecher and Pertl (1983) investigate the impact of large losses on firms in a variety of industry 
sectors. A large loss is broadly defined as the loss of property, the loss of productive capacity, or 
a large liability claim that is expected to result in damages of at least 10% of the affected firm’s 
total net worth.
6. See Lamb (1995) who investigates the abnormal returns for insurance firms following Hurricane 
Andrew and Shelor et al. (1992) who study the reaction to the California Earthquake of 1989.
7. One method that is also frequently applied is to estimate a firm’s future performance using 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). The CAPM 
expresses a firm’s expected return as E(R
t
) = R
f,t + t [E(Rm,t) – Rf,t ] where E(Rm,t) is the expected 
return of the market on day t, Rf,t represents the risk-free rate as measured by the return on 90-
day U.S. or Canadian Treasury Bills on day t, and βt is the estimated slope coefficient from a 
linear regression of the stock’s past returns on the returns of the market. There are no significant 
qualitative or quantitative differences between the results obtained when using the CAPM 
model or the market model.
8. Note that there are approximately 250 trading days per year. Thus, 21 trading days are 
approximately equal to one calendar month.
9. For convenience, we refer to “railroad companies” and “railroad accidents” throughout this 
study. Accidents involving publicly traded regional transport systems such as Dallas Area 
Rapid Transit are also included in the sample.
10. Note that accidents involving Amtrak trains are not included in the analysis as Amtrak is not 
publicly traded.  In unreported tests, it was investigated whether accidents involving Amtrak 
trains running on rails owned by freight railroads such as CSX resulted in stock price declines 
for the track operators.  The tests suggested no abnormal performance for the freight railroads 
following the accident, even if poor track maintenance was blamed for the accident. As pointed 
out by in a recent report by the New York Times (see Bogdanich, W. “Death on the Tracks: 
Amtrak Pays Millions for Others’ Fatal Errors.” New York Times, October 15, 2004), Amtrak 
has been paying accident-related liability claims arising from accidents involving its trains, 
regardless of fault, as a condition for using the freight lines’ tracks. This indemnification 
agreement likely contributed to Amtrak’s poor performance in recent years.
11. Note that the accidents investigated and reported on by the NTSB represent only a small subset 
of accidents that actually occurred in any given year. While the FRA reports information for a 
much larger number of railroad accidents (many of which would also fulfill this study’s sample 
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selection criteria), their database is not used as a primary data source as it lacks the depth that 
the NTSB reports provide.
12. Note that property damages reported by the NTSB and the FRA only deal with damage to 
railroad property such as the track, signaling equipment or rolling stock. They do not include 
damages to third parties, shippers’ property, or lawsuit settlements.
13. To ensure the robustness of the results, various robustness tests were performed in which 
alternative market proxies such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average or the CRSP value-
weighted market index were used (for accidents involving U.S. railroad companies). For 
Canadian railroads, similar robustness tests were performed using the S&P/TSE 60 and the 
TSE 100 index. The results are qualitatively and quantitatively highly robust to variations in the 
underlying index.
14. Other regressors such as the number of fatalities are approximately normally distributed, thus 
we do not apply a log transformation to these variables.
15. Note that the sample includes four accidents by Canadian railroad companies. Three accidents 
involved Canadian National and one accident involved Canadian Pacific Railway.
16. Although railroad companies are typically covered through legal liability insurance, other 
factors such as the loss of consumer confidence and higher legal costs may explain the larger 
stock price reaction for accidents involving many injuries, fatalities, and hazardous material 
spills (see also Savage (1998) who provides an extensive discussion of liability and insurance 
arrangements in the railroad industry).
17. While the breakpoints for the univariate analysis were arbitrarily chosen, the results are highly 
robust when selecting alternative breakpoints.
18. Note that the coefficient of the logged market capitalization variable is -0.2483. To calculate the 
exact effect of an x% increase in a logged regressor on a dependent variable, one can multiply 
the coefficient with ln(1+x/100). Thus, to measure the effect of a 100% increase in market 
capitalization on a firm’s CAR, the coefficient is multiplied with ln(2) or 0.6931. The result is 
(-0.2483)*(0.6931) or -0.1721. Thus, a doubling in firm size leads to an additional price decline 
of approximately 0.17%, other factors held constant (see Berenson et al. 2001).
19. Note that the number of fatalities or injuries is not logged Thus, the interpretation of the 
coefficients (-0.2128 and -0.0310) is straightforward.
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